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Alter the Currency 
NE CAN ONLY SPECULATE as to the series of experiences that led to 
this book, so unlike any other, whose arguments I will repeat here. 
Diogenes, to whom Goodchild refers, was cast out of his native 
Sinope because he was said to have defaced the coinage. Later, he will be told 
by the oracle that he should also deface current human values and customs, 
challenging and rejecting conventional pieties. It was said that he had himself 
sold as a slave, demanding that his purchaser pay him for his wisdom. So it is 
with this book: buy it and you will have to pay doubly if you are drawn to 
undergo the experience towards which its author would draw you. It was his 
exile, Diogenes thought, which made him a philosopher – it is not he who 
was exiled from Sinope, but Sinope itself that was exiled. He becomes 
thereby the first cosmopolitan, a citizen of the universe, altering every 
currency. If Goodchild writes that the conjunction of insights that led to this 
book “fractured my self consciousness, exposing an abyss beneath all my 
thoughts and relations to myself, to others and to the world;” that, through 
them “I became a stranger to those closest to me as well as to myself,” we 
know that it is the same experiences that brought him into an awareness of a 
universal problem. (xiv) This is a work of philosophy remarkable as it 
appears in the midst of textbooks and commentaries, introductory guides 
and scholarly monographs – it is vastly erudite, compellingly argued, 
striking in its analyses and impassioned in its approach. Like the Cynic, who 
is committed to speak the truth, to practice parrhesia, Goodchild writes of a 
truth which we are not ready to confront, but which grants, at the same time, 
the possibility of a new universality, a cosmopolitanism, a commonwealth. 
Peter Sloterdijk: “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are 
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doing it.”1 We know there must be an awakening to the consequences of 
globalization - to the endless overproduction which demands the spread of 
the market into new territories, the outsourcing of labor to countries where it 
is cheaper, and a general deregulation. The autonomous free market leads to 
the transformation of the world into a market for goods and services; 
formerly self-sufficient peoples, along with their customs and traditions, are 
homogenized; more fossil fuels are consumed and carbon dioxide emitted in 
the transportation of goods and services; fertilizers, pesticides and pollutants 
are used in order to extract the maximum possible yield, and agricultural 
land is taken from rural populations in order to provide irrigation for 
industry. Alongside the reality of ecological catastrophe, there is the threat of 
economic catastrophe: how might any government bail out an economic 
crisis when the national economy is vulnerable to the volatility of the 
international movement of finance? There is also the danger that national 
economies default on the loans. What happens if the cost of oil production 
rises too much? The apocalypse is approaching; we know but we carry on 
regardless.  
The Price of Thought 
Why hasn’t the currency of thought altered? What can one expect when the 
price of thought is measured by strategic plans, quality assurance certificates, 
audits and appraisals? The professional thinker is a worker in a world where 
what is important is not performance but the appearance of performance, not 
efficiency but the simulacrum of efficiency. Who am I in this system? The 
functionary, the role, the stamp of a bureaucratic power. Which is to say, 
hardly anyone (who I am does not matter; I perform the acts that will keep 
me in my job, in the good esteem of my colleagues, in the good auspices of 
the university). The price is a waste of life: attention is benumbed through the 
simple, stupid horror at vast administrative and bureaucratic structures 
which cover of the world. It is as if, through a peculiar doubling, another 
world had been subtly, carefully, laid over this one – as if we live and think 
in a map of a territory and no longer upon the territory itself. In this way, 
attention is diverted and summoned away from what matters; philosophy 
does not rise to its own vocation. 
And outside the academy? For a happy minority, credit is plentiful and 
goods are cheap. But for the majority, the future is grim. But all stand before 
the same horizon, the same looming catastrophe, whether we want to or not. 
Why do the terrifying claims of the report on the results of climate change 
commissioned by Pentagon defense adviser Andrew Marshall not grip us 
                                                          
1  Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
29. 
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before any other problem?2 Our attention is misdirected. Is this the effect of 
our governments, which no longer answer to international law, or to the 
wishes of its people?  
Politics is possible only for as long as our attention is uncoupled from the 
magic of image, spectacle and glamor as they circulate in the mass media. It 
is possible only when we extend the scope of that which lays claim to our 
attention. Vaster than the number of countable voters is the polity of those 
who will have to live in a world which becomes progressively less 
inhabitable as well as those outside our country with whom we are bound in 
networks of interdependency. Then there is the land itself, the territory with 
which we must maintain an interrelation.  
Our political system encourages short-termism and populism: the political 
candidate must be adept at handling the mass media; it is necessary to look 
and speak the part, which means wealth, appearance and debating skills 
supplant the ethical sensibility which would allow the politician to respond 
to what matters. A political response articulated out of a universal awareness 
is barely conceivable. But the catastrophe may still be preventable which 
means nothing is more pressing that developing this awareness. 
Our attention has been captured. How to bind apathy in the face of politics 
into a universal politics which works on a local and a worldwide level that 
can struggle for the world? But there is no one to listen; the commonwealth 
has disappeared. There is no public when the European tradition of reason 
with its faith in a public standard of rationality has collapsed, and when there 
is only suspicion of the same values which once united us: truth, wisdom, the 
human being. Then to link religion and capitalism, as Philip Goodchild does, 
is anachronism itself: didn’t the experience of God disappear from our lives 
long before the collapse of the very notion of public rationality?  
The Murder of God 
What matters most? This book presents us with four insights which have not, 
according to Goodchild, been thought in their interrelation. Firstly, there is 
the truth of suffering: human life is not sustainable, but the ecological 
catastrophe is preventable; secondly, the awareness that money has become 
the self-positing measure of all values; thought and values themselves must 
be understood in terms of their monetary value; thirdly, the awareness of 
what Goodchild calls the “experience” of God and fourthly, the awareness of 
the “murder of God” as this reveals the nihilism of the European tradition – 
the values which devalue themselves.  
                                                          
2  See Mark Townsend and Paul Harris’s “Now the Pentagon tells Bush: climate change will 
destroy us” at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1153513,00.html 
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Traditional accounts of this murder will not suffice. It is not the development 
of nominalism, or the displacement of religious authority from ecclesiastical 
institutions to individual conscience in the Reformation, or the rise of the 
experimental method in the sciences which transformed the concretion of 
knowledge and prepared the way for secularism and atheism; none of these 
accounts for their condition, which is, Goodchild argues, a shift in pieties – a 
shift from God to Mammon, which is to say, the murder of God happens 
because of the emergence of the self-regulating market as the basis for the 
organization of the social order.  
What brought about this emergence? In an impressive analysis, Goodchild 
explains that risks of inflation, until the eighteenth centuries, meant that total 
coinage could only be introduced with the conquest of new territories. With 
overseas investment, the asset-stripping of the conquered territories, the 
organization of the slave trade, such an increase in coinage could occur. But 
the greatest step came with the nationalization that created the Bank of 
England, which allowed a secure value to be attached to bank notes, enabling 
long term, low interest loans which could be secured against future taxation. 
Thus, the economy could function on the basis of an infinitely deferred 
redemption of a promise of value. Money is thus created as a loan on the 
basis of a debt. But this means production is always increased in order to 
obtain a profit on the loan. The value of assets is now determined through a 
speculative anticipation of its rate of return. But just as currency is circulated 
in the form of banknotes which never have to be cashed in, the value of assets 
is determined by a future which never arrives. Since the market will not 
crash (the government can always raise more taxes), there is now no limit to 
the amount of money that can be created. Our material and social reality is 
wagered on the basis of an ideal future; the national power which creates the 
Bank of England is seized by what it seized. The issuing of government 
bonds and, later, trading on financial futures and derivatives, exacerbates 
(what is?) already set in motion. 
What follows? Prices are determined for commodities, excess production is 
encouraged and new needs are created with the consequences of ecological 
devastation and financial uncertainty. The operation of the free market sees 
labor subordinated by debt bondage, slavery, the threat of unemployment or 
the outsourcing of labor to countries where it can be bought more cheaply. 
Labor has no choice but to participate either because of debt or because it is 
enthralled by the idea of making money. Yet this is no only a lesson in 
economics. Goodchild insists in linking money to the murder of God. Contra 
economic theory, money is not the innocent medium which would permit 
commodities to be traded, but that which provides the access to all other 
values. And thus the highest values devalue themselves; Mammon usurps 
the place of God. 
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Piety 
One might ask: why is this such a loss? Do we live in the most humane of 
human societies? But we are blinded by the self-evidence of economics as it 
serves to uphold the apparently benevolent despotism of liberal humanism. 
Economics cannot take account of the suffering which results when the social 
and material condition of the present is wagered on the basis of an ideal 
future. “Suffering exceeds in importance any meaning or any future which 
can be substituted for it;” “Suffering has an excess of meaning and 
significance which cannot be captured by substitution or superposition. 
Suffering is always singular; it marks itself out as a singular event.” (213) 
What is to be done? How might one alter the currency? Might one hold out 
for a redirection of attention – for a new piety, a new religion, a new 
conception of God and with it, a new understanding of truth and goodness? 
For Goodchild, to alter the currency is to redirect attention. It is to 
understand economics and economism as a kind of piety – as a way of 
directing attention away from what matters. But it is also to counterpose a 
religious piety to economic piety as it is founded upon excess and not 
conservation. 
One might object that this talk of piety is nostalgic. Doesn’t scientific progress 
already testify to the anachronism of the appeal to piety? But, for Goodchild, 
the currency of truth must be altered, since the apparent stability purchased 
through abstraction wagers the real. When truth is understood as immutable, 
incorporeal and identical over time, it threatens to pass over what is 
changeable, material and discontinuous. The objects of astronomy or 
mechanics are indeed regular and ordered in their behavior – but this is not 
the case with the ostensible object of economics. Abstractions like Gross 
Domestic Product, which purport to provide us with the value of an 
economy, cannot calculate the repercussions to the environment; a cost-
benefit analysis does not permit the analyses of the threat of financial 
catastrophe. Goodchild suggests the “truth” of economics is itself pious, 
which is to say, it claims our attention in a particular sense. Piety should not 
be understood negatively. A revival of a certain religious piety may well 
permit us to attend to what is changeable and discontinuous, to the 
indeterminable matter of the world which disappears in economic piety.  
Religious Piety 
Pierre Bourdieu writes of the mason who forewent the ritual meal that was 
supposed to be eaten in the mason’s honor after he had constructed a house. 
He asked for 200 francs in exchange for the meal in addition to the 1,000 
francs for the construction itself. What is wrong with that? The event of the 
meal – the taste of the food, the animals killed to supply that food, the 
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friendships which are formed and reaffirmed over that meal, conversation 
and conviviality - is not substitutable. Trust is everything in the system 
Bourdieu describes; therefore, the temptation is to cheat by feigning 
trustworthiness.  
One might understand the transition of ritual to historical piety to occur at 
this point, although Goodchild warns us against any simple understanding 
of this transition. The God of historical piety is understood as being able to 
bestow reparations for suffering in the present: He will publish deceit and 
wickedness; the righteous will prosper and the wicked will perish. Piety, 
here, is no longer directed towards the ritual repetition of a past event but to 
the future. Abraham, trusting the promise of God, leaves Ur because of a 
promise; he ventures his life on this uncertainty. Ritual piety is put to death 
when he is called to sacrifice his son; meaning and value spring out of this 
gesture. Hebrew monotheism depends upon a rejection of idolatry: one 
worships one God; the past, and the ritual piety in which one returns 
ceaseless to the past, is sacrificed in view of a universalism. Piety is now 
oriented towards the future – to the coming of the Messiah, or, with 
Christianity, to the return of Christ which will bring about the Kingdom of 
God.  
But here, already, the divine economy allows God to resemble Mammon. The 
event of the murder of God has already been prepared; historical piety is 
perilously close to the economism that will allow commodification and 
reification. But religion does not collapse into capitalism. Broadly speaking, 
for Goodchild, religious piety is still able to embrace the singular and 
exceptional: it can attend to suffering because it is pluralistic in a way capital 
is not. Doesn’t Marx show this when he allows that money “is the god among 
commodities”3– that it is “the incarnation of exchange value?”4 The monism 
of capitalism allows it as it were to worship itself; piety synthesizes time such 
that the future becomes, for the financier, the object of speculation even as, 
for the householder, the future harbors catastrophe: the threat that he or she 
will be unable to subsist. 
It is perhaps because only the philosopher of religion can understand the 
stakes of what Goodchild calls apocalyptic piety – an experience which 
directs itself towards the singularity of suffering in a way outside the 
consensus. Apocalyptic piety opens what Goodchild calls the “chaotic 
interval” which other forms of piety conceal (indeed, other forms of piety, 
whether economic or religious, are precisely an attempt to shield themselves 
from chaos). One cannot bring oneself into such piety through an act of will. 
Rather, it reveals itself only in an experience of excess which overwhelms the 
consensual determination of what is real. Philosophy of religion, 
                                                          
3  Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 22. 
4 Marx, Grundrisse, 163.  
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understanding apocalyptic piety in its philosophical and political stakes, 
which is to say, as a way of revealing a future no longer bound by chains of 
necessity to the present, rises to its vocation to alter the currency. Such a 
philosophy must be a critical theory of religion because otherwise the 
experience of God which gives itself in apocalyptic piety will be 
misunderstood. Only thus might the thinker plunge into the reality of change 
and discontinuity – to the becoming and affect of the world as it exceeds 
economic determination and is bound, in that opening, to what Goodchild 
calls absolute faith.  
Reading these pages, I am reminded of Tarkovsky’s film Nostalghia. We first 
meet Domenico as he is prevented from his attempt to cross the hot pool 
dedicated to Saint Catherine of Siena in the Tuscan village Bagno Vignoni, 
where the protagonist of the film, the Russian poet Gorchakov is staying. 
Domenico, we learn, locked himself in the house for seven years with his 
family, waiting for the end of the world. Gorchakov is taken by this stranger. 
When he is told Domenico is mad, he replies: “We don’t know what so-called 
insanity, or madness, is. First, they are inconvenient; they get in everyone’s 
way. Their behavior, their wishes lie outside the generally accepted rules. 
And then, we simply don’t wish to understand them. They are terribly 
lonely, but I’m sure they are closer to the truth than we are.” Later, Domenico 
immolates himself after preaching to the army of solitaries he has gathered 
about him for three days and nights. Before he sets himself on fire, he cries: 
“What is this world worth, what is the value of its truth if some unhappy 
mental patient, as you call us, tells you: ‘You should be ashamed of 
yourselves!’ While there’s still time!” 
Tarkovsky shows us Domenico’s death is not beautiful. He falls and crawls 
along the ground, crying out. In the interval between the immolation and his 
death, he is just a man who has set himself alight. His is the mad attempt 
draw the whole world into the fire of sacrifice and bring it shuddering back 
into birth. But it is, perhaps, the act of madness which reveals the madness of 
the world and thus the chaotic interval between one future and another. 
Meanwhile, far away, Gorchakov has heard of Domenico's death. He takes 
the stub of a candle and begins to walk across the drained pool. This is not an 
act of ritual piety (the repetition of an eternal past), nor even an act of 
historical piety. It is not performed in the service of righteousness. Dazzled 
by the chaotic interval, it honors an apocalyptic piety.  
I wonder whether Goodchild’s philosopher of religion must embody both 
Domenico and Gorchakov, answering to the opening of the chaotic interval 
and then, afterwards, patiently transmitting that experience, along with the 
singularity of suffering to which it is linked. The first apocalyptic experience, 
the experience of the interval, leads to death, or at least a kind of dying 
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(Domenico’s self-sacrifice; the shattering of self-consciousness which 
Goodchild himself describes). It gives way to a second – the affirmation of 
difference as a potency of which nothing can be known. Such difference is 
wondrous – to think, henceforward, is to answer what is unthinkable; it is to 
direct attention to an experience whose source one cannot render explicit. But 
Goodchild maintains a third apocalyptic experience is necessary through 
which one comes to understand the experience in question, the affirmation of 
difference, as an experience of God. I will close with a quotation from the last 
chapter of Religion and Capitalism, which, if I do not yet understand, is a sign, 
for me of the necessity of rereading this book: 
Apocalyptic piety has no name for the God it experiences, no identity on 
which to cling. It is merely an experience after the death of God, the subject 
and the world. It follows the dissolution of reality and the dissolution of the 
will. If it awakens to God as Truth, Goodness and Awareness, this is not a 
God it can condition, possess or will. It is merely an experience. Apocalyptic 
piety stands outside itself: it is a capacity to laugh at, relinquish and forgive 
oneself; it is a capacity to attend to suffering; it is a capacity to bear within 
oneself little fragments of heaven and hell. It is compassion. (243) 
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